Washington, D. C. 20505

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable Harold Brown

Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

: Visit to Yugoslavia

I'm confident DOD will arm you plentifully with background to do your military sales and exchanges work in Yugoslavia, but I thought this run down of broader subjects that are likely to come up, or on which you could be a valuable collector, might be useful background for you.

STANSFIELD TURNER

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US-Soviet Relations:

The Yugoslavs will be anxious to get your views on the status of our relations with Moscow. They have mixed emotions on this matter. They realize that tensions between Washington and the Kremlin can have an adverse effect on stability in their region; on the other hand, they are deeply suspicious of great power collusion at their expense.

Progress toward world disarmament is a central goal of the Tito regime, and Yugoslavia took the lead in calling for a UN Special Session on this issue. Yugoslavs thus will be particularly eager to discuss the state of play of the US-Soviet dialogues on SALT, MBFR and the military confidence building measures under CSCE.

Yugoslav-US Relations:

Among the "sleeper" issues that may surface are the following:


- --Emigres: The subject of emigre terrorism against Yugoslav diplomats and missions in the US comes up in most bilateral contacts. Since the Yugoslav army has a major role in maintaining internal security, we would expect them to emphasize their deep concern.
- --The Neutron Bomb: The Yugoslav military has displayed a bad case of nerves over this weapon. They see its development as representing an alarming turn in the arms race. The neutron bomb is for them a psychologically demoralizing threat because it could erode their own population's will to fight:

- --Nuclear Proliferation: The Yugoslavs have been extremely critical of US-led efforts to stem the international circulation of nuclear technology. They have frequently said that unless the nuclear powers restrain their own weapons development, international restraints such as the NPT will be ineffective.
- --Atmospherics: The Secretary's visit comes close on the heels of Edvard Kardelj's successful talks in Washington. Such a highly visible improvement in US-Yugoslav relations may well make some Yugoslav officials edgy over the possible reaction the Soviets may have to this trend. We expect, therefore, that the Secretary's visit will be played with delicacy and restraint in the Yugoslav media.

Soviet Presence in Yugoslavia

Several sources report that during Tito's late August visit to Moscow the Soviets reiterated their long-term interest in establishing a more extensive military presence in Yugoslavia. We think it likely that Tito again rejected these overtures, but some sources have implied that some minor concessions were granted.

The Soviet Mediterranean Fleet continues to use Yugoslav repair facilities under the fairly restrictive terms of the 1974 legislation. We have no evidence of any change in the level of Soviet naval presence since the Tito-Brezhnev talks. The question of whether Belgrade would actually permit other countries, including the US, to use their repair facilities—as they have said they would—remains open.



The Situation in the Mediterranean:

The Yugoslav military will want to take a reading on our assessment of the chances for another crisis in the region. The Arab-Israeli dispute and Cyprus will be foremost in their minds. They are probably most concerned about a renewal of fighting in the Middle East as this would again force them into a corner. They would feel compelled to:

- --permit Soviet overflights to the Arabs;
- --become sharply anti-US in international forums;
- --and waste resources on military preparations--such as alerts--out of apprehension that the conflict would widen.

Although of lesser magnitude, another flareup of Libyan-Egyptian hostilities is also of concern to Belgrade. The Yugoslavs have tilted toward Qadhafi. They will probably press you to use US influence to restrain Sadat.

<u>Albania:</u>

Albania causes inordinate concern in Yugoslavia. Belgrade fears that future instability in that neighboring country might lead to:

- --a Soviet restoration in Albania of their once powerful position (that appears unlikely in the near term.);
- --a group coming to power in Tirana openly hostile toward Yugoslavia. (There is a small (about six percent) but politically volatile Albanian minority in Yugoslavia that could cause a post-Tito regime major problems. Some Yugoslav Albanians avow an interest in a "Greater Albania.")

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Yugoslav-Albanian relations will not have been improved by Tito's warm reception in Peking. Tirana is involved in a public polemic debate with its once close Chinese ally, and Chinese shortfalls in economic assistance rankle.

Withal, Yugoslav officials may have some insights into the troubled internal party situation in Albania, with Hoxha rumored embarking on his fourth major purge in recent years.

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Approved F Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP80M00 5A001700060004-7 ATHE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505 t me Lune a National Intelligence Officers October 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence FROM Robert R. Bowie Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence : Talking Themes for Secretary Brown's Visit SUBJECT to Yugoslavia Action Requested: -That you send Secretary Brown these talking points that are likely to come up, or would be useful for him to raise, during his visit to Yugoslavia. The Secretary leaves Washington the afternoon of Thursday, 6 October. Background: We assume that DOD will provide adequate background on the military sales and exchanges issues that Secretary Brown is going to Yugoslavia to discuss. Attached are background data, talking themes and questions that may help him in his larger role of furthering US-Yugoslav relations and in eliciting Yugoslav views on a variety of important questions on which US information is limited. 25X end to below Robert R. Bowie 25X This memorandum may be removed from special channels when separated from attachments. 25X

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